O'Donnell, J. R. Anton Charles Pegis on the occasion of his retirement.--Conlan, W. J. The definition of faith according to a question of MS. Assisi 138: study and edition of text.--Spade, P. V. Five logical tracts by Richard Lavenham.--Maurer, A. Henry of Harclay's disputed question on the plurality of forms.--Brown, V. Giovanni Argiropulo on the agent intellect: an edition of Ms. Magliabecchi V 42.--Synan, E. A. The Exortacio against Peter Abelard's Dialogus inter philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum.--Fitzgerald, W. Nugae Hyginianae.--Sheehan, (...) M. M. Marriage and family in English conciliar and synodal legislation.--Shook, L. K. Riddles relating to the Anglo-Saxon scriptorium.--Boyle, L. E. The De regno and the two powers.--Colledge, E. A Middle English Christological poem.--Gough, M. R. E. Three forgotten martyrs of Anazarbus in Cilicia.--Häring, N. Chartres and Paris revisited.--Hayes, W. Greek recentiores, (Ps.) Basil, Adversus eunomium, IV-V.--Owens, J. The physical world of Parmenides. (shrink)

Agency is a power, but what is it a power to do? The tradition presents us with three main answers: (1) that agency is a power to affect one’s own will, consequent upon which act further events ensue, beginning with the movement of a part of one's body; (2) that agency is a power to affect one’s own body, consequent upon which act further events ensue, beginning with the movement of an object that one touches; and (3) that agency is (...) a power to affect that material upon which one brings one's action to bear---e.g. the apple one is peeling (with a knife in one's hand). These three answers correspond to three increasingly expansive conceptions of the province of human agency. I refer to them, respectively, as volitionalism, corporealism and materialism. Only the first two are seriously considered in contemporary action theory. Favoring the third, and hoping to sharpen the conflict between the third and the first, I criticize the second. Corporealism has been a popular position—arguably, the default position in the philosophy of action—since Donald Davidson’s classic paper “Agency” (1971). Although it seems to occupy a sensible middle ground between volitionalism and materialism, corporealism is, I argue, indefensible: it shares the vulnerabilities of both its two rivals, without possessing the strengths of either. Nevertheless, reflection on corporealism lights the road to materialism, which, in the end, is the only possible alternative to volitionalism. (shrink)

In contrast to the theories of relativity, quantum mechanics is not yet based on a generally accepted conceptual foundation. It is proposed here that the missing principle may be identified through the observation that all knowledge in physics has to be expressed in propositions and that therefore the most elementary system represents the truth value of one proposition, i.e., it carries just one bit of information. Therefore an elementary system can only give a definite result in one specific measurement. The (...) irreducible randomness in other measurements is then a necessary consequence. For composite systems entanglement results if all possible information is exhausted in specifying joint properties of the constituents. (shrink)

This article maps existing research from 5,874 scholarly publications on social entrepreneurship (SE) utilizing scientometrics. The mapping indicates a taxonomy of five clusters: (a) the nature of SE, (b) policy implications and employment in relation to SE, (c) SE in communities and health, (d) SE personality traits, and (e) SE education. We complement the scientometric analysis with a systematic literature review of publications on SE in the Financial Times 50 list (FT50) and Business & Society and propose a multistage, multilevel (...) framework that highlights the clusters of existing research on SE based on their stage and level of analysis. This review study also helps outline a set of future research directions, including studies examining (a) the process stage at the micro-level and macro-level, (b) linkages across levels and stages, (c) linkages across stages over time or longitudinal studies, (d) SE in resource-constrained environments, (e) technological advancement and its impact on SE, (f) the types of social enterprises and their outcomes, and (g) various emerging topics in SE. (shrink)

For as long as there has been anything called “the philosophy of action,” its practitioners have accounted for action in terms of an associated kind of explanation. The alternative to this approach was noticed, but not adopted, by G. E. M. Anscombe. Anscombe observed that a series of answers to the reason-requesting question “Why?” may be read in reverse order as a series of answers to the question “How?” Unlike answers to the question “Why?”, answers to the question “How?” are (...) not explanatory of what they are about: they reveal, not reasons for doing something, but ways of doing something, and they have the form of what Aristotle called a practical syllogism. The alternative to theorizing action in terms of explanation, is, thus, to theorize it in terms calculation. In exploring this alternative, I argue for three main theses: first, that (pace Anscombe) it is not a matter of indifference whether we theorize action in terms of the question “Why?” or in terms of the question “How?”; second, that the question “Why?” is a question for an observer of action (the agent already knows the answer and can learn nothing from the inquiry), whereas the question “How?” is a question for the agent—and moreover, one that the agent must answer in order to achieve any end whatsoever—so that part of what is at stake is the standpoint from which action is to be theorized; and finally, that the standpoint of the agent, revealed by the question “How?”, is prior to that of an observer. (shrink)

Evolution and life phenomena can be understood as results of history, i.e., as outcomes of cohabitation and collective memory of populations of autonomous entities across many generations and vast extent of time. Hence, evolution of distinct lineages of life can be considered as isomorphic with that of cultures. I argue here that cultures and culture-like systems – human culture, natural languages, and life forms – always draw from history, memory, experience, internal dynamics, etc., transforming themselves creatively into new patterns, never (...) foreseen before. This is possible thanks to the fact that all forms of life are descendants of life. Ontogeny and speciation in various lineages draw from continuous re-interpretation of conservative genetic/generic “texts”, as well as from changes of the interpretative process itself. The result is continuous appearances of new lineages-cultures and/or communities-cultures, in a semiotic process of re-interpretation and inventing new ways of living. The topic is developed here on the backgrounds of ideas presented by R. A. Rappaport in “Ritual and religion in the making of humanity” and J. Flegr in “Frozen evolution”. (shrink)

Scientific communication takes place at two registers: first, interactions with colleagues in close proximity—members of a network, school of thought or circle; second, depersonalised transactions among a potentially unlimited number of scholars can be involved (e.g., author and readers). The interference between the two registers in the process of peer review produces a drift toward conflict of interest. Three particular cases of peer review are differentiated: journal submissions, grant applications and applications for tenure. The current conflict of interest policies do (...) not cover all these areas. Furthermore, they have a number of flaws, which involves an excessive reliance on scholars’ personal integrity. Conflicts of interest could be managed more efficiently if several elements and rules of the judicial process were accepted in science. The analysis relies on both primary and secondary data with a particular focus on Canada. (shrink)

The recent introduction of the concepts of tenderness, vulnerability, and parental care in the field of moral emotions has brought us closer to an understanding of the underlying mechanisms, but has not yet resulted in a systematic evolutionary and proximate analysis. Applying such an analysis, the present article proposes a hypothetical care mechanism that produces different motivational states or moral emotions (e.g., tenderness, sympathy, guilt, moral anger) in response to individuals perceived as vulnerable. The mechanism consists of a care system (...) automatically triggered by vulnerability cues, a system for defense and aggression, and a process of causally attributing changes in the vulnerable object’s well-being. The mechanism may also be useful in explaining moral responses in domains other than harm prevention. (shrink)

English summary: In this work, Anton Friedrich Koch develops a hermeneutical realism using methods of analytic philosophy, i.e. the thesis that although the real is independent from individual beliefs and perceptions, it is, however, not independent of there being beliefs and perceptions at all. We, the finite spatiotemporally embodied subjects, are therefore not a 'cosmic coincidence' but rather necessary for the existence of the material system of space-time, which, on the other hand, encompasses us and is in no way (...) a fiction or construction (subjectivity thesis). This brand of realism is hermeneutical because it treats knowing as a special case of reading and translating - of things into spoken language - (readability thesis), and in giving room to the discovery that completeness and consistency, as in mathematics, are likewise incompatible in the description of the world (antinomy thesis). German description: Anton Friedrich Koch begrundet und entwickelt in diesem Werk mit Mitteln der analytischen Philosophie einen hermeneutischen Realismus: die philosophische Lehre, dass das Reale zwar von einzelnen Meinungen und Wahrnehmungen unabhangig ist, nicht aber davon, dass es uberhaupt Meinungen und Wahrnehmungen gibt. Wir, die endlichen, raumzeitlich verkorperten Subjekte, sind also kein Zufall, sondern notwendig fur die Existenz des materiellen Raum-Zeit-Systems, das uns andererseits weitraumig umgibt und keineswegs unsere Konstruktion oder Fiktion ist (Subjektivitatsthese). Hermeneutisch ist dieser Realismus, weil er das Erkennen als einen Sonderfall des Lesens und Ubersetzens - der Dinge in Wortsprache - begreift (Lesbarkeitsthese) und weil er der Entdeckung Raum gibt, dass Vollstandigkeit und Widerspruchsfreiheit, wie in der Mathematik, so auch in der Weltbeschreibung unvertraglich sind (Antinomiethese). (shrink)

The discussion of whether people understand themselves and others by using theories of behaviour (theory theory) or by simulating mental states (simulation theory) lacks conclusive empirical evidence. Nichols et al. (1996) have proposed the Langer effect (Langer, 1975) as a critical test. From people's inability accurately to predict the difference in the subjective value of lottery tickets in choice and no‐choice conditions, they argued that people do not simulate behaviour in such situations. In a series of four experiments, we consistently (...) failed to replicate the original difference between choice and no‐choice under the conditions used by Nichols et al. We conclude that the replicability of the effect depends on an unknown combination of factors. As long as the target effect is not better understood and under better experimental control, it is difficult to use it as a yardstick against which the accuracy of simulation can be assessed. (shrink)

As the title indicates, the author does not intend to comment on the Instruction Donum Veritatis, but to bring some precision regarding the function of the theologian in the Church in the light of the document of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. The subtitle qualifies the work of the theologian as ecclesial and scientific. The theme must be situated in the context of a global vision of the Church as mystery of communion and as mission, as this (...) is presented in the Instruction. The author starts from the theologico-anthropological roots of the function of the theologian and of theology; these are intrinsically connected with God's revelation and the gift of Christian truth which constitutes their object, and with faith as the response of the entire people of God and the theologian to God's call. Faith, as personal option and as content , is the primordial element of the epistemological status of theology. Theology is critical, systematic research, faithful to the demands of divine revelation. The body of the article attempts to situate the function of theology and the theologian in the triangle constituted by the people of God, to which the gift of divine revelation is addressed, and the Magisterium and the theologians who are at the service of the community of the faithful. In this service the Magisterium and the theologians fulfil proper and complementary functions in keeping with their place in the Church. The theologians have a functio. (shrink)

I discuss the foundations of predicate ontologies based on two model notions – elementary states of affairs and eventualities, i.e. ordered pairs of initial and end states of affairs. Vendlerian classifications are oriented towards elementary states and tense logic, while Davidsonian classifications deal with eventualities and event logic. There are two kinds of atemporal predicates - fact and properties. Facts are propositional arguments of second-order predicates which add a special meaning that the embedded proposition was verified. Properties are atemporal first-order (...) predicates that lack eventive interpretation and are not associated with factive frames. Davidsonian states are homogeneous durable spatiotemporal things distinct both from atemporal properties and spatiotemporal dynamic predicates. Davidsonian states are causally independent, while resultatives are causally determined as they reconstruct a preceding event that has caused the end state p. I discuss the contrast between external and internal Davidsonian states. The former lack a priority argument and can be quantified extensionally. The latter have a priority experiential argument and can only be quantified intensionally. External states can be observed, while internal states cannot. (shrink)

The American way of Renaissance and the Humanistic Tradition of Greece -- The Aristotelian tradition in American naturalism -- George Santayana and Greek philosophy -- Frederick J.E. Woodbridge and the Aristotelian tradition -- John Dewey and ancient philosophies -- John H. Randall Jr.'s interpretation of Greek philosophy -- The ontology of Herbert W. Schneider -- Ernest Nagel's pragmatism and Aristotle's principle of contradiction -- The naturalistic metaphysics of Justus Buchler -- Naturalism and the platonic tradition.

This paper introduces and discusses three models of future: a determinist model, a stochastic model, and the model of True Prophetic Knowledge. All three models coexist in natural languages and are represented both in their grammatical systems and in the text-building discourse strategies speakers and authors apply to.

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 64 Heft: 6 Seiten: 879-893.

The traditional formalism of quantum mechanics is mainly used to describe ensembles of identical systems (with a density-operator formalism) or single isolated systems, but is not capable of describing single open quantum objects with many degrees of freedom showing pure-state stochastic dynamical behaviour. In particular, stochastic 'line-migration' as in single-molecule spectroscopy of defect molecules in a molecular matrix is not adequately described. Starting with the Bohr scenario of stochastic quantum jumps (between strict energy eigenstates), we try to incorporate more general (...) pure-state stochastic dynamical behaviour into the quantum mechanical formalism.Probability distributions of (approximately) pure states, arising through the stochastic pure-state dynamics for long times, give rise to appropriate decompositions of thermal density operators. These decompositions of density operators into pure states mediate between quantum mechanics for ensembles of molecules and quantum theory for single molecules (or single dressed quantum objects). We suggest that such decompositions should be consistent with infinite limits (e.g. the Born-Oppenheimer limit for infinite nuclear masses) in the sense that quantum fluctuations (around classical behaviour in the infinite limit) die out asymptotically. (shrink)

The article consists of a general introduction and two main parts, the first relating to sensory, qualitative consciousness and the second to discursive, intentional consciousness. The general thesis of the first part can be formulated like this: Humans literally overlap in their infinite spatiotemporal field of consciousness, which is one and the same for all and is only oriented differently by each individual, namely egocentrically in each case. On the basis of this common extended consciousness we can talk to each (...) other about things. In the second part, the thesis – inspired by the divergent picture theories of elementary sentences developed by the early Wittgenstein and then by Wilfrid Sellars – is argued that when we talk about things, we read them and translate them into verbal language. We read them as world-sided primordial tokens (1) of their names, (2) of phenomenal “this-such” representations of them, and (3) of various elementary sentences about them, thus treating them as objects, as Kantian intuitions and as token facts respectively. Incidentally, this result can serve to illuminate Heideg­ger’s thesis in his 1950 lecture on language that it is originally language that speaks – as the “ringing of silence” or “chiming of stillness” (“Geläut der Stille”) – and that humans have the call to speak back to language in talking to each other, i.e. to respond to the chiming of stillness. (shrink)

This paper explores the meaning of dreamless sleep. First, I consider four reasons why we commonly pass over sleep's ontological significance. Second, I compare and contrast death and sleep to show how each is oriented to questions regarding the possibilities of "being-a-whole." In the third and final part, I explore the meaning and implications of "being-toward-sleep," arguing that human existence emerges atop naturally anonymous corporeality (i.e. living being). In sum, I try to show that we can recover an authentic — (...) if somewhat ambiguous — sense of "being-a-whole" only by recognizing the ontological significance of dreamless sleep. (shrink)

In June 1998 Hans Primas turned 70 y ears old. Although he himself is not fond of jubilees and although he lik es to play the decimal system of numb ers do wn as contingent, this is nev ertheless a suitable o ccasion to re ect on the professional work of one of the rare distinguished contemp orary scientists who attach equal imp ortance to exp erimen tal and theoretical and conceptual lines of researc h. Hans Primas' in terests ha (...) ve covered an enormous range: metho ds and instruments for n uclear magnetic resonance, theoretical c hemistry , C - and W -algebraic formulations of quantum mechanics, the measurement problem and its various implications, holism and realism in quantum theory , theory reduction, the w ork and p ersonality of Wolfgang Pauli, as well as Jungian psychology . In man y of these elds he provided imp ortan t and original fo o d for though t, in some cases going far b eyond the ev eryda y business in the scientic world. As is the case with other scien tists who are conceptually innov ativ e, Hans Primas is read more than he is quoted. His in uence is due to his writings. Even with the current ood of publications, he still p erforms the miracle of ha ving scientists eagerly a waiting his next publication. His external life, by wa y of contrast, is not very sp ectacular. With the exception of a brief p erio d as a guest professor at Washington Univ ersity at St. Louis, he has never b een a wa y from Zuric h for an y length of time. He has nev er b een a warded an y prizes, nev er organized a congress, nev er done any organizational work in a scientic so ciety . He delib erately distanced himself from the hustle and bustle of national and in ternational scien tic business. (shrink)

Gran parte de los estudios sobre la naturaleza de la cognición social, que también se ha entendido como una perspectiva de se-gunda persona, ha tenido lugar en el marco de la llamada “teoría de la mente”, entendida básicamente como capacidad inferencial de atribución de estados mentales. La fenomenología, por el contrario, advierte la naturaleza corporizada e integrada de la experiencia de sí, lo que permite, consecuentemente, el acceso inmediato a la experiencia vivida del otro. La incorporación de esta comprensión de (...) la cognición social en el ámbito experimental ha planteado un giro interactivo: de perspectivas observacionales y mecanismos individuales a escenarios interactivos y procesos participativos. Este trabajo se propone mostrar tanto el sentido fenomenológico de la cognición social como así también las diversas interpretaciones que han encontrado aplicación en la experimentación neurocientífica en cuanto perspectivas de segunda persona, a fin de evaluar sus aportes y ofrecer posibles tareas aún pendientes.Most of the studies on the nature of social cognition, which has also been understood as second-person perspective, have taken place within the framework of the so-called "theory of mind", basically understood as inferential capacity for attribution of mental states. Phenomenology, on the contrary, shows the embodied and integrated nature of self-experience, which consequently allows immediate access to the lived experience of the other. The incorporation of this understanding of social cognition in the experimental field has proposed an interactive turn: from observational perspectives and individual mechanisms to interactive scenarios and participatory processes. This work aims to show both the phenomenological meaning of social cognition as well as the various interpretations that have found application in neuroscientific experimentation as second-person perspectives, in order to evaluate their contributions and offer possible open tasks. (shrink)

La determinación husserliana de la evidencia como cumplimiento [Erfüllung] llevó a una tácita identificación de la evidencia con la conciencia plena. Sin embargo, el desarrollo de su fenomenología revela que en todo caso se presenta como una síntesis particular de plenitud y vacío, configuración que resulta modal por tratarse de una conciencia de posibilidad aunque en un sentido material y no cualitativo. Los Prolegómenos aportan un primer elemento en esta línea –que sólo en la fenomenología genética resulta explícita–: la evidencia (...) como vivencia de la verdad supone que la validez de un enunciado se sustenta en la posibilidad de la existencia de otros enunciados idénticos de la misma forma y materia; con las Investigaciones lógicas, estas multiplicidades posibles serán comprendidas como momentos en un nuevo contexto descriptivo: la mención y el cumplimiento, lo cual otorga estatuto intencional a la objetividad que se configura como escorzo de sentido, esto es, el modo en que la unidad determinada de plenitud y vacío –en cuanto horizonte de cumplimiento posible– conforma la evidencia objetiva.Husserlian determination of evidence as fulfillment [Erfüllung] brought a tacit identification of evidence with full consciousness. However, the development of his phenomenology reveals that it always appears as a particular synthesis of fullness and emptiness, configuration that turns out to be modal because it is a consciousness of possibility though in a material and not qualitative sense. The Prolegomena introduce a first element in this perspective –that only in the genetic phenomenology becomes explicit–: evidence as experience of truth supposes that the validity of a judgment supports itself in the possibility of existence of other identical judgments with the same form and matter; with the Logical Investigations, this possible multiplicities will be understood as moments in a new descriptive context: mention and fulfillment, whereby objectivity –configured as adumbration of sense– acquires intentional status, i. e., the mode in which the determined unity of fullness and emptiness –as horizon of possible fulfillment– shapes objective evidence. (shrink)

Abstract The infantilization of older adults seems morally deplorable whereas very young children are appropriate recipients of such treatment. Children, we argue, are not mentally capable of acting autonomously and reasoning clearly. However, we have difficulty reconciling this justification with the fact that many of the elders whom we respect are mentally deficient in those very same ways. In this paper, I try to make sense of this asymmetry between our justifications for infantilizing the young and our conviction that our (...) elders ought to be respected. I argue that our intuitions against adult infantilization are non-consequentialist (i.e., deontic). I consider several candidates for the deontic factor that might explain the asymmetry of our judgments and practices. I argue that a very specific kind of dignity (one that is socially constructed and reified) grounds our disparate judgments and treatments of very young and very old persons with similar needs. (shrink)

This article examines the political crisis that has appeared in the constitutions of 28 democratic states. The units of analysis have been chosen using the criterion of a modern and formal constitution. Using the systemic paradigm, the article proposes an institutionalist ap- proach. After explaining the role of the main institutions, the article focuses itself on identifying the mechanisms of crisis as they are provided by constitutions (i.e. the vote of no-confidence, the motion of censure, the vacancy etc.). We have (...) observed that the correlation between the institutional arrangement and the number of crisis mechanisms is not very strong one. The article concludes that in order to explain the reaction of a political system towards a crisis situation it is not sufficient to draw on the constitution, an understanding of the political tradition and of the recent political experiences being absolutely necessary. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that H. Friedman’s gap condition is closely related to iterated collapsing functions from ordinal analysis. But what precisely is the connection? We offer the following answer: In a previous paper we have shown that the gap condition arises from an iterative construction on transformations of partial orders. Here we show that the parallel construction for linear orders yields familiar collapsing functions. The iteration step in the linear case is an instance of a general construction that we (...) call ‘Bachmann–Howard derivative’. In the present paper, we focus on the unary case, i.e., on the gap condition for sequences rather than trees and, correspondingly, on addition-free ordinal notation systems. This is partly for convenience, but it also allows us to clarify a phenomenon that is specific to the unary setting: As shown by van der Meeren, Rathjen and Weiermann, the gap condition on sequences admits two linearizations with rather different properties. We will see that these correspond to different recursive constructions of sequences. (shrink)